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I. INTRODUCTION
AIR SPORTS such as parachuting, ballooning, and ultralight
Z ying continue to increase in popularity.' Not surprisingly,
rising participation leads to an increase in the number of inju-
ries associated with these sports. While some air sport injuries
are unavoidable, others are a direct consequence of provider or
equipment manufacturer error. But, recovery in negligence for
the later type of injury is effectively nonexistent due to judicial
tolerance for exculpatory contractual provisions between service
providers and participants2 and a legislative scheme that limits
the liability of land owners.3 Private insurance provides a less
than satisfactory alternative because many policies contain avia-
tion exclusions applicable to air sport activities.4 In spite of
comprehensive federal regulation of pilots and procedures, vio-
lations of those regulations which result in injury do not trans-
late into a remedy for the injured participant. 5
The grim reality for air sport enthusiasts and their families is
that the legal system is uniformly disapproving of their activities.
Consequently, they continue to bear the burden of serious bod-
ily injury and death even where colorable claims of negligence
exist against those who profit from the sports' wide appeal.6
The challenge for personal injury practitioners is to carve new
avenues of recovery from the current barriers.
The focus of this Comment is to aid the practitioner in meet-
ing this challenge. Clearly, the successful pursuit of claims for
I See Bill McNabb, Are Sports Torts Now Par for the Course? The Reckless Disregard
Standard for Sport Participation Liability, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 723 (1994).
2 See, e.g., Schutkowski v. Carey, 725 P.2d 1057, 1062 (Wyo. 1986).
3 See generally John C. Becker, Landowner or Occupier Liability for Personal Injuries
and Recreational Use Statutes: How Effective Is the Protection?, 24 IND. L. REv. 1587
(1991) (discussing recreational use statutes and changes in traditional land
owner liability laws).
4 See Amatuzio v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 409 N.W.2d 278, 279 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987); Cabell v. World Serv. Life Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pittman v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 17 F.2d
370, 371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 750 (1927).
5 1 PAUL S. DEMPSEY ET AL., AViATION LAw AND REGULATION 4-15 (1992). "The
Federal Aviation Act does not address or set forth rules of liability for personal
injury or wrongful death ... nor does it purport to preempt the law of torts in
this area." Id. Likewise, this Comment does not purport to undertake a discus-
sion of federal preemption issues. Although nearly every area of aviation activity
involves some federally preempted matter, the issues surrounding tort recovery
for air sport injuries are primarily a state concern at the present time. Id.
6 Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY
L.J. 1, 106 (1993).
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air sport injuries is a complex endeavor involving many more
issues than can be covered here. Thus, this Comment is offered
simply as an overview of the most vexing problems facing the
tort practitioner and some potential areas for investigation of
and solutions to these problems.
The logical starting point in any discussion of aviation-related
activities is the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). Because
the FARs help to define the relevant actors and their relation-
ships, the Comment will introduce the guidelines set by the
FARs for parachuting, 7 ultralight flying,8 ballooning,9 and the
pilots who make these sports possible.10 To acquire an under-
standing of the permissible behavior, the case law regarding the
practical effect of the regulations, as well as the judicial interpre-
tation of the contractual arrangements of the parties, will be set
forth in detail. The status of private insurance as an aid to com-
pensation is included under the rubric of contractual
arrangements.
The Comment will then examine the tort aspects of air sport
activities and the consequences for participant recovery. In con-
trast to simple negligence, products liability for equipment man-
ufacturers is presented as a more hopeful theory of recovery.1
Next, it is necessary to discuss the effect of state legislation on
land owner liability in order to flesh out the scope of the barri-
ers to recovery as well as the niches where possibilities for recov-
ery lie.
Finally, this Comment will not address air sport injuries which
result in the absence of clearly identifiable negligence or other
wrongdoing. No argument will be made in support of recovery
for injuries that result from mere contact with the ground after
an otherwise uneventful undertaking, for example, a broken an-
kle upon landing on an unremarkable surface. Indeed, the in-
spiration of the Comment comes from a recognition of the
harsh results that occur for the participant who is injured as a
result of negligence collateral to the risks ordinarily accompany-
ing air sport activities. 2 Therefore, the guidance for practition-
7 14 C.F.R. § 105 (1996).
8 14 C.F.R. § 103 (1996).
9 14 C.F.R. § 31 (1996); 14 C.F.R. § 101 (1996).
10 14 C.F.R. § 61 (1996).
11 See Prince v. Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83 (Alaska 1984).
12 E.g.,Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981) (injuries sustained by para-
chutist in plane crash due to negligent failure of operator to supply adequate
amount of gasoline for the flight).
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ers is limited to recovery in clearly meritorious cases and is not
intended to expand the number of cases filed.
II. FEDERAL AIR REGULATIONS
A. PILOT CERTIFICATION
Almost every aspect of air sport activities is governed by the
FARs.'3 While these regulations prescribe individual pilot train-
ing,14 they also include behavioral limits for activity participants
in specific situations. 15 This section is intended to define the re-
sponsibilities and qualifications of those to whom participants
entrust their safety.
Commercial pilots, those certified to transport passengers for
monetary compensation, must meet tougher eligibility require-
ments than either recreational or private pilots.1 6 The pilot
must be at least eighteen years of age, speak English, hold a sec-
ond-class medical certificate, and pass the written and oral ex-
aminations appropriate for the desired aircraft rating.'" In
addition, a commercial pilot with an airplane, rather than glider
1s See supra note 5 for the limitations of the regulations in the injury context.
14 The regulations controlling certification of pilots and their ratings are
found at 14 C.F.R. § 61 (1996). Certification requirements for recreational pi-
lots, private pilots, and commercial pilots are found at 14 C.F.R. §§ 61.96-.101
(1996), §§ 61.102-.120 (1996), and §§ 61.121-.141 (1996) respectively. Most cases
of air sport injury will involve a commercial pilot who is the "pilot in command of
an aircraft carrying persons or property for compensation or hire." 14 C.F.R.
§ 61.139 (1996). However, some cases will arise, especially in the products liabil-
ity context, where the pilot is the injured participant and is subject to either the
recreational or private pilot regulations.
15 14 C.F.R. § 105.13 (1996), for instance, proscribes the parachute jumper
from engaging in a jump that "creates a hazard to air traffic or to persons or
property on the surface."
16 Compare 14 C.F.R. § 61.123 (1996) (commercial pilots) with 14 C.F.R. § 61.96
(1996) (recreational pilots) and § 61.103 (private pilots). As 14 C.F.R. § 61.129
(1996) makes clear, commercial pilot certificates are issued by the FAA only after
the certified private pilot has, inter alia, at least 250 hours of flight experience.
Presumably, the additional requirements for passenger carriers acting in a busi-
ness capacity are intended to promote safety and fairness to consumers.
The test for determining the "commercial" status of any aeronautical activity
requiring a commercial license states: "Where it is doubtful that an operation is
for 'compensation or hire,' the test applied is whether the carriage by air is
merely incidental to the person's other business or is, in itself, a major enterprise
for profit." 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1996). Clearly, the typical parachute school, glider
school, or balloon sight-seeing outfit should be staffed with properly certified
commercial pilots.
17 14 C.F.R. § 61.123 (a)-(e).
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or balloon rating, must log at least 250 hours of flight time. 8
The FARs require commercial pilots to acquire general knowl-
edge in areas such as the National Transportation Safety Board
accident reporting system, basic aerodynamics, and an under-
standing of the aircraft's operations and problem recovery tech-
niques.19 Commercial glider and balloon pilots are specifically
required to be cognizant of the implications weather conditions
may have for safe flight.20
B. ULTRALIGHT VEHICLES
In contrast to the strict guidelines set for commercial pilots,
ultralight operators "are not required to meet any aeronautical
knowledge, age, or experience requirements to operate those
vehicles."2 1 Indeed, the craft itself need not meet airworthiness
certification standards or even be registered.22 An ultralight ve-
hicle is defined in part as one that: "(a) [i]s used or intended to
be used for manned operation in the air by a single occupant, (b)
[i]s used or intended to be used for recreation or sport pur-
poses only; [and] (c) [d]oes not have any U.S. or foreign airwor-
thiness certificate. '"2 3
The safety implications of such lax regulations were hotly de-
bated in the years immediately after the regulations were
promulgated. 24 But both scholars and the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) have shown a conspicuous lack of concern
for the safety of the actual ultralight operator.25 Thus, the air
18 14 C.F.R. § 61.129. In recent years, the popularity of increasingly extreme
sports has led to deviations from traditional air sports. Thus, it is now more likely
that a parachutist or bungee jumper will alight from a hot air balloon. While
balloon pilots need not meet the stringent airplane rating experience require-
ments, they are still bound by the parachute jumping provisions discussed in full
infra, text accompanying notes 35-42. Gliders will probably not be involved in
parachute incidents.
19 14 C.F.R. § 61.125(a) (1996).
20 Id. § 61.125(c) (3), (e)(3) (1996).
21 14 C.F.R. § 103.7(b) (1996).
22 Id. § 103.7 (a), (c).
23 Id. § 103.1(a)-(c) (emphasis added).
24 See, e.g., Richard H. Jack, Ultralight Aircraft: A Need for Better Regulation Than
14 C.ER § 103, 51 J. AIR L. & CoM. 415 (1986) (discussing inadequacies of cur-
rent regulations and how they increase danger to other aircraft); Sudie Thomp-
son, FAA Regulation of Ultralight Vehicles, 49 J. AIR L. & CoM. 591 (1984)
(questioning whether minimal regulations and reliance on self-policing ensure
proper safety level).
25 Jack, supra note 24, at 415; Thompson, supra note 24, at 595 (quoting Ber-
nard Geier, Manager of the General Aviation and Commercial Division of the
FAA: "We consider this a sport.... The FAA is not responsible for protecting the
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sport participant who enjoys light glider and other one-person
aviation activities is free to do so without interference from the
FAA. To the contrary, where a glider does not meet the ul-
tralight classification because it is equipped to carry two persons,
the pilot would be held to the standard glider regulations and
requirements for certification.26
C. FREE BALLOONS
In sharp contrast to ultralight regulations, the FARs prescrib-
ing the functions of free balloons are quite extensive. 27 The pri-
mary concern of Part 31 is airworthiness standards, and design
and manufacture specifications and their compliance with safety
guidelines.28 A balloon "must be designed so that failure is ex-
tremely remote or so that any single failure will not jeopardize
safety of flight. 29
The concern with flight safety expressed in Section 31 is
echoed in Section 101's regulation of operators and hazardous
conditions. 30 The responsibility for conducting a safe flight lies
exclusively with the operator. In addition, association with the
operator defines the persons or class of persons to whom protec-
tion from hazards is extended .3 But, in the specific situation of
dropping objects from balloons, prohibition of endangering
others is extended to all "other persons or their property."3
2
Thus, while Part 101's concern with safety of operations does
not appear to encompass operators or passengers, it does sug-
pilot against himself; it is responsible for protecting the public and the air-
space."); Freeman v. United States, 509 F.2d 626, 631 (6th Cir. 1975) (clear disa-
vowal of any intent to protect the parachutist).
26 See 14 C.F.R. § 103.1(a) (1996).
27 14 C.F.R. § 31; 14 C.F.R. § 101.
28 Section 31.20 of the FAR requires "that the balloon is safely controllable and
maneuverable during takeoff, ascent, descent and landing without requiring ex-
ceptional piloting skill." Clearly, the FAA intended to make sure that operations
of free air balloons do not push the envelope of pilot skills. There is no indica-
tion that this requirement is restricted to commercial pilots. Thus, the solo bal-
loon operator is protected from overextension of his own skill, caused by the
design of the equipment, by regulations which are totally absent in ultralight
operating situations.
29 14 C.F.R. § 31.25 (1996).
30 14 C.F.R. § 101.
31 14 C.F.R. § 101.33(e) (1996) prohibits only balloon flights which are hazard-
ous "to persons or property not associated with the operation." Id. (emphasis added).
This restriction represents another example of the FAA's lack of concern for par-
ticipants. In the balloon context, 14 C.F.R. § 101.33 arguably strips protections
from ground crews or even investors or family present to view the flight.
32 14 C.F.R. § 101.7 (1996).
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gest protection for mere spectators.3 Only Part 31 appears to
give the operator or passenger a basis for complaining of injury.
Clearly, this would be limited to situations involving manufac-
turer or product defects.34
D. PARACHUTE JUMPING
In addition to the pilot requirements laid down in Section 61
of the Federal Rules of Aviation, Section 105 addresses regula-
tions for parachute jumping in more detail.35 Notably, these
regulations create a dual responsibility for pilot and parachutist
to comply with the guidelines.3 6 But, the burden continues to
lie with the pilot in command to ensure that the technical de-
tails of the flight are managed properly. 37 The regulations do,
however, hold the parachutist responsible for a considerable
amount of technical knowledge.
For instance, the parachutist is deemed to know that jumps
over airports without a functioning control tower are prohib-
ited,38 whether the nearest FAA facility has been notified of the
jump at least one hour in advance, 9 that jumping through a
cloud is forbidden,40 and that jumping between sunset and sun-
rise requires special equipment. 4' It is unlikely the novice or
casual parachute jumper possesses this level of knowledge. As
such, the pilot should inform the jumper of these responsibili-
33 Id.
34 See generally 14 C.F.R. § 31 (regulating airworthiness standards).
35 14 C.F.R. §§ 105.1-.43 (1996). Section 105.1(b) defines a parachute jump as
"the descent of a person, to the surface from an aircraft in flight, when he in-
tends to use, or uses, a parachute during all or part of that descent." This de-
scription does not include a jump made in response to emergency conditions.
Id. § 105.1(a).
-6 Each major area covered by 14 C.F.R. § 105 begins with the following lan-
guage: "No person may make a parachute jump, and no pilot in command of an
aircraft may allow a parachute jump to be made from that aircraft ...... 14
C.F.R. § 105.
37 See, e.g., id. § 105.14(a) (2) ("The pilot in command of an aircraft used for
any jumping activity in or into controlled airspace shall, during each flight ....
[m]aintain... a continuous watch on the appropriate frequency of the aircraft's
radio communications system... and [a]dvise ATC ... when the last parachute
jumper from the aircraft reaches the ground." Id. (emphasis added)).
38 14 C.F.R. § 105.17 (1996).
39 14 C.F.R. § 105.23 (1996).
40 14 C.F.R. § 105.29 (1996). See Freeman, 509 F.2d at 631 for a discussion of
the level of responsibility of a parachutist for complying with pilot instructions.
41 14 C.F.R. § 105.33 (1996).
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ties.4 2 If the jumper does behave improperly, the logical conclu-
sion, considering the regulations, is that the pilot is co-equally
responsible for allowing a dangerous or non-regulation jump to
take place.
Surprisingly, the FAA regulations do not provide protection,
by way of redress from the instructor or pilot, to the air sport
participants who pay for air sport services.43 In fact, in Jones v.
Dressel,44 the Colorado Supreme Court indicated that non-con-
formance with FAA regulations does not affect a claim of negli-
gence in the air sport context.45 Because providers are often
considered to be outside the class of service organizations which
bear the burden of a statutory duty of care, participants who do
business with air sport providers may not invoke the doctrine of
negligence per se against the provider to prove negligence with
respect to a violation of the Federal Aviation Regulations."
III. BARRIERS TO RECOVERY AND POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS
The Federal Aviation Administration Regulations regarding
air sport activities do nothing more than help define the prob-
able actors in a suit for negligence once an injury has occurred.
For the most part, negligence cases will be brought by either the
injured participant or his or her family against a properly li-
censed provider or pilot. Moreover, the usual case will involve
42 See Hammerlind v. Clear Lake Star Factory Skydiver's Club, 258 N.W.2d 590
(Minn. 1977) (Suggesting that the pilot is under no duty to ensure that the
jumper is properly equipped or prepared. But, under state law, that duty does
fall to a jump master or other member of the provider staff.).
43 DEMPSEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 4-15. 14 C.F.R. § 135.1 governs the applica-
bility of the regulations on commercial operators. Specifically exempted from
coverage are nonstop flights conducted within a 25 statute mile radius of the
airport of takeoff carrying persons for the purpose of intentional parachute
jumps. Id. § 135.1(5). Consequently, the extensive duties and operational re-
quirements for commercial operators do not apply to parachute operations that
work within these parameters.
- Jones, 623 P.2d at 370.
45 Id. at 377. The court held that private air charter services are not under the
duties of commercial operators as defined by the Code of Federal Regulations
because carriage by air was incidental to the operator's principal business. Id.
Remarkable as it may be that carriage of persons in the air is considered inciden-
tal to conducting a parachute jump, the court is supported indirectly by § 135.1
of the Federal Aviation Regulations.
46 Id.; see, e.g., Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987, 990 (N.Y. 1939) ("Where a stat-
ute defines the standard of care and the safeguards required to meet a recog-
nized danger, then .... Failure to observe the standard imposed by statute is
negligence, as a matter of law.").
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an exchange of money for the services provided. That is, the
provider is engaged in the sport for compensation.4 7 The busi-
ness arrangement between the provider and participant is the
central focus of most air sport negligence cases.48 Indeed, the
contractual agreement is the biggest hurdle for tort practition-
ers seeking recovery for an injured client.
Because air sport providers invariably insist on the participant
signing a contractual release agreement before getting into the
air," success in a negligence case will depend upon the exact
provisions of the contract. Contrary to the general rule, many
courts have held that the use of exculpatory clauses in these con-
tracts does not establish the existence of an adhesion contract.50
Courts extend a variety of rationales to support the propriety of
exculpatory clauses in the air sports context. Yet, on the whole,
the tone ofjudicial opinion suggests that courts feel these activi-
ties are simply unreasonably risky and unnecessary, and there-
fore unworthy of protection from generally disfavored liability
limitations.5 1
47 Because the pilot will be carrying passengers for compensation, it may also
be assumed that he holds a commercial pilot's license. 14 C.F.R. § 61.123 (1996).
48 See generally Falkner v. Hinckley Parachute Ctr., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 941 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989) (exculpatory clauses valid absent willful misconduct); Schutkowski,
725 P.2d at 1057 (signed release and indemnity agreement valid release of plain-
tiffs claims); Jones, 623 P.2d at 370 (accepting benefits of contract considered
ratification).
49 Most courts which address the contractual issues in negligence suits for air
sports injuries rule that the lack of evidence that the services were available else-
where under more favorable terms militates in favor of the provider. See, e.g.,
Jones, 623 P.2d at 374-75; see also Lynn Guissinger, Exculpatoy Clauses and Public
Policy: A Judicial Dilemma, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 793, 798 (1982) (discussing neces-
sity for legislative action to solve difficulty with exculpatory clauses). Practical
experience, however, suggests that the vast majority of air sport providers, as well
as providers of other risky recreational ventures, will refuse service unless and
until the contract including the waiver of claims is signed by the participant.
Schutkowski, 725 P.2d at 1058. The fact that liability insurance is difficult to ob-
tain for the provider adds support to the assertion that negligence disclaimers are
standard in the industry. See Marcia Chambers, Whatever Happened to the Sandlot?,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 22, 1991, at 15, 16.
50 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); Guis-
singer, supra note 49, at 801.
51 For instance, the court in Falkner, 533 N.E.2d at 945, held that: "[S]ome risk
of fatal injury is ordinarily attendant to the sport of parachute jumping .. " Air
sports are held out routinely as the quintessential example of foolish or unrea-
sonable behavior. See, eg.,Johnson v. Rapid City Softball Assoc., 514 N.W.2d 693,
700 (S.D. 1994).
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A. EXCULPATORY CLAUSES AND ADHESION CONTRACTS
In Jones, the court set forth a four-part test for determining
the validity of an exculpatory clause.5" The relevant considera-
tions are: (1) whether a duty to the public exists; (2) the nature
of the service performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly en-
tered into; and (4) whether the intention of the parties is ex-
pressed in clear and unambiguous language.53 This standard
has been widely followed in other jurisdictions and represents
the leading approach in hazardous activity cases.5 4
The first determination is often resolved against the partici-
pant by application of the standard laid down in Tunkle v. Re-
gents of University of California.55 In Tunkle, the court stated that a
duty to the public was to be found if the contract "concerns a
business of a type generally thought suitable for public regula-
tion. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a
service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter
of practical necessity for some members of the public."5 6
Although use of air space is a heavily regulated public con-
cern,5 7 courts have been very reluctant to adjudge air sport activ-
ities as "a matter of practical necessity." 95 8
Not surprisingly, courts also hold uniformly that by their na-
ture, air sports services are not "essential," 59 and are therefore
52 Jones, 623 P.2d at 376; Judges, supra note 6, at 11.
53 Jones, 623 P.2d at 376.
5 See, e.g., Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177 (1993); Falkner,
533 N.E.2d at 941; Schutkowski, 725 P.2d at 1057.
55 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
56 Id. at 445-46.
57 For the reasons discussed supra in the text accompanying note 44, most
courts do not rule on the "public regulation" aspect of the Tunkle test.
58 Schutkowski, 725 P.2d at 1060. Donald P. Judges has attacked this approach
to inherently risky behavior. Judges, supra note 6, at 1. Judges asserts that the
current legal system is insensitive to the value of participation in physically dan-
gerous endeavors. Id. at 11. In essence, "[r]isk minimization neglects the valua-
ble experience of choosing, confronting, and overcoming risk; it unjustifiably
infringes autonomy by imposing only one view of life well lived (and risks appro-
priately taken) on everyone." Id. at 9. While Judges's exploration of the differ-
ences among individuals in their levels of "risk-seeking" is beyond the scope of
this Comment, his observations point out the possibility that there are those
among us who truly need heightened levels of stimulation to be whole. Id. at 12-
26. In addition, Judges feels that "there is little reason to suppose that judges-
who by temperament are likely to be risk averse .. .- will be any more sensitive
than juries to the value of risk choice." Id. at 82. Hence, the primarily negative
judicial view of air sports may be understood as an improper exercise of judicial
value judgment based upon personal preferences.
5-9 Schutkowski, 724 P.2d at 1060.
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not akin to services such as housing and utilities, where provid-
ers traditionally have been barred from limiting their own
liability.6°
Both the first and second elements of the Jones test involve an
overriding determination of whether public policy demands
that the exculpatory clauses be voided because of the nature or
circumstance of the activity. 61 Most courts and state legislatures
have determined that private recreational agreements do not
support a public policy argument for voiding exculpatory
clauses.62 But some courts have held that allowing one party to
be at the mercy of another's negligence is necessarily against
public policy.63
Recently, one court has gone even further. The Vermont
Supreme Court held in Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd.64 that the lack of an
"essential public service does not resolve the public policy ques-
tion in the recreational sports context.... [w]hen a substantial
number of [recreational agreements] take place as a result of
the [provider's] general invitation to the public to utilize the
facilities and services in question, a legitimate public interest
arises. '' 65 In so holding, the court expressed serious concerns
about the effect of exculpatory clauses on the level of care that
recreational providers exhibit toward their paying customers.66
This decision marks a significant step forward for injured air
sport participants, in that it recognizes the cumulative effect pri-
vate contractual arrangements have on the safety of entire in-
dustries. Moreover, because this decision arose in the
60 Henriouelle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465, 469-70 (Cal. 1978); cf
O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 155 N.E.2d 545, 547 (Ill. 1958)
(exculpatory clause valid).
61 Thomas H. Winslow & ErnestJ. Asprelli, Jr., Negligence Disclaimers in Hazard-
ous Recreational Activities, 68 CONN. B.J., 356, 359-60 (1994). Because air sports
activities do not represent a public duty and are not essential in nature, there is
no public policy against liability limitation provisions in the service contracts.
The public at large has no interest in being protected from such provisions.
Therefore, unless the latter two elements of the Jones test are found to be lacking,
these private agreements will be upheld. Id. at 360.
62 See, e.g., Mann v. Wetter, 785 P.2d 1064, 1066 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) ("There is
nothing inherently bad about a contract provision which exempts one of the par-
ties from liability" for negligence.); Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306 (N.Y. 1979).
63 Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Community Ass'n, 418 S.E.2d 894, 897 (Va. 1992).
64 Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 670 A.2d 795 (Vt. 1995).
65 Id. at 799 (discussing the issue in the alpine skiing context).
66 Id. ("If defendants were permitted to obtain broad waivers of their liability,
an important incentive for [providers] to manage risk would be removed with the
public bearing the cost of the resulting injuries.").
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hazardous sports context, there is no apparent reason to limit its
effect to the ski industry in which it arose. 67
The third element of the Jones formulation provides the in-
jured party another opportunity to void the exculpatory clause.
"Whether the contract was fairly entered into" involves an explo-
ration of the circumstances surrounding the formation of the
contract.68 Courts generally consider the relative bargaining
power of the parties, the opportunity to obtain the services else-
where, and any alternatives to the contract provision in ques-
tion.69 In Jones, the court found that the clause barred recovery
because there was no indication that the plaintiff did not under-
stand the waiver or that the opportunity to parachute did not
exist through other providers.7 0 Moreover, even though the
plaintiff was only seventeen at the time he signed the contract,
the court found no disparity of bargaining power.7 '
This finding is based upon a presumption that a provider of
non-essential services cannot take unfair advantage of the par-
ticipant because the participant may always opt to avoid the ac-
tivity rather than sign an objectionable contract.7 2 In addition,
the contract in Jones contained a provision that would have al-
lowed the plaintiff to retain his rights to recovery for the pay-
ment of an additional sum. However, the provision was crossed
out before being presented to the plaintiff. The court ruled that
these facts did not imply that negotiations for a more advanta-
geous contract were out of the question.73
Jones is typical of air sport negligence cases on this point.
Courts appear to be uninterested in exploring the true, rather
than assumed, circumstances of the bargaining process or ex-
tent to which it is possible to participate without signing the
form contract. Again, because the service is not necessary, the
courts feel comfortable holding the participant to the somewhat
67 A long list of "hazardous" recreational activities can be grouped together for
purposes of analyzing the effect of exculpatory clauses. For example, scuba div-
ing, ski racing, bungee jumping, rock climbing, and auto racing have all been
labeled inherently "hazardous" or dangerous. Winslow & Asprelli, supra note 61,
at 360; Judges, supra note 6, at 7; Christopher A. Love, Law in the Pits: Lago v.
Krollage and Contractual Limitation of Liability Under New York Law, 8 J. SUFFOLK
ACAD. L. 63 (1992).
68 Guissinger, supra note 49, at 796.
69 Id. at 798.
70 Jones, 623 P.2d at 376.
71 Id.




specious option of foregoing participation altogether. In con-
tracts that deal with essential services or scarce resources, a
"take-it-or-leave-it" approach to contract formation will often
prompt the court to rule the contract one of adhesion, and
therefore void. Yet where the party attempting to void the ex-
culpatory provision had a reasonable opportunity to decline the
contract, courts appear willing to allow private parties much
more latitude."4
Finally, if the preceding elements of an exculpatory clause are
present, the language of the clause is often the deciding factor
in determining its validity. 75 Where the waiver provision does
not make its effect abundantly clear, the court will likely resolve
the ambiguity in favor of the injured party according to estab-
lished canons of interpretation. 76 However, because of the gen-
eral dislike for liability waivers, some courts have required a
valid exculpatory clause to use the term "negligence" specifi-
cally. 77 Those courts that do not insist on the magic language
will, nonetheless, require a clear statement of the extent of the
waiver of liability. 78
The majority view regarding the validity of exculpatory clauses
in the recreational context presents the major obstacle to recov-
ery for injured air sport participants. Because nearly all partici-
pants will gain access to the sport through a service provider,
and nearly all service providers will require a contract which in-
cludes an exculpatory clause, the difficulty seems unavoidable.
But, there is room within the contract framework for recovery.
74 Winslow & Asprelli, supra note 61, at 363-64.
75 The provision in Johnson v. Paraplane Corp., 460 S.E.2d 398, 400 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1995) is an example of a clearly worded, valid exculpatory clause:
I hereby forever RELEASE AND DISCHARGE Paraplane (R) Cor-
poration, its directors, agents, employees, instructors, pilots, and
dealers; all powered parachute instructors, advisors and ground
personnel, the owners of the aircraft and land utilized for Powered
Parachute Flights Activities, their agents, employees and servants,
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Released Parties") from any
and all liabilities, claims, demands or causes of action that I may
hereafter have for injuries and damages arising out of my participa-
tion in Powered Parachute Flight Activities, including, but not lim-
ited to, losses CAUSED BY THE PASSIVE OR ACTIVE
NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASED PARTIES (CJ) or hidden, la-
tent, or obvious defects at the Flight Center or in the equipment
used.
Id. at 400.
7 Schutkowski, 725 P.2d at 1060; Gross, 400 N.E.2d at 309.
77 Gross, 400 N.E.2d at 370.
78 Schutkowski, 725 P.2d at 1060.
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The foregoing should make clear that the level of resistance to
negligence exculpatory provisions varies significantly from juris-
diction to jurisdiction. Virginia, Delaware, and a few other
states have determined that negligence waivers are void as
against public policy as a matter of law.79 In these jurisdictions,
the participant will not have to overcome the complete bar to
recovery which valid negligence waivers command.80
In addition, there is case law that recognizes the possibility of
a claim of negligence against actors other than the service pro-
vider. In Freeman v. United States,"' the court found negligence
on the part of the air traffic controller (ATC) who mis-identified
the location of the parachute drop plane.8 2 Clearly, the partici-
pants could not have contractually waived a claim of negligence
against the air traffic controller. Moreover, because the ATC's
negligence was independent of the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions, the plaintiffs did not have to struggle with a negligence
per se argument based upon those regulations.83 Thus, the
court affirmed the trial court's finding of negligence and al-
lowed recovery.84
In addition to the possibility of air traffic controller negli-
gence, Springer v. United States"5 establishes that affiliated serv-
ices, such as the National Weather Service (NWS), may be held
negligent in the performance of their aviation-related duties.86
In Springer, information improperly coordinated and dissemi-
nated by the NWS and various FAA air traffic control organiza-
tions was found to be the proximate cause of the crash of a
private airplane which resulted in the pilot's death."7 Specifi-
cally, the court found "that in the absence of taking any steps to
place the high winds information into the national weather sys-
tem, so that it would be available to pilots through weather brief-
ings ... personnel had an affirmative duty to relay directly that
information to a pilot ... who would encounter the unusually
79 Daluiy, 670 A.2d at 198-800; Durrell v. Parachutes Are Fun, Inc., No. 85C-
AU-82, 1987 WL 18117, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 1987).
80 Paralift, Inc. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 4th 748, 756 (1993).
81 509 F.2d at 626.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 630-31.
84 Id. at 634.
85 641 F. Supp. 913 (D.S.C. 1986), affd, 819 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. 1987).
86 Id. at 927 (ATC's negligence was compounded by "negligence of the NWS in
failing to correct its forecast even after information became available that the
existing forecast was inaccurate.").
87 Id. at 936-37.
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high winds,""8 and "[g]iven that defendant undertook to pro-
vide a service that was necessary for the protection of Springer,
and that Springer relied on that service, the court finds that de-
fendant owed Springer the duty of reasonable care in operating
its weather observation and aviation forecast system." s9
Obviously, not every case will involve the negligence of a per-
son not a party to the service contract. However, as indicated by
the damages awarded in Springer for wrongful death ($1.3 mil-
lion), 9° searching beyond the immediate service provider for
other negligent actors can prove to be a key step in obtaining
adequate recovery for the participant. Thus, both Freeman and
Springer illustrate the value to practitioners of exploring options
that avoid the likely consequences of a suit against the service
provider.
Finally, even where the participant has ratified a valid excul-
patory clause, the provider cannot limit liability for gross negli-
gence.91 In Durrell v. Parachutes Are Fun, Inc.,92 the trial court
denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment because
the plaintiff had raised a material issue of fact as to the claim of
gross negligence." Durrell had signed a clearly worded, valid
exculpatory clause. 94 But, under the test set forth by the Mary-
land Supreme Court, the trial court ruled that the defendants'
failure to "answer specific questions regarding basic parachuting
techniques prior to a person's second jump could imply 'a
thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the exertion
of any effort to avoid them [sic].'"9 5 Therefore, the plaintiff was
entitled to a trial on that issue.96
88 Id. at 926.
89 Id. at 936-37.
90 Ia. at 938.
91 Falkner, 533 N.E.2d at 941; Boucher v. Riner, 514 A.2d 485, 487-89 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1986) (court declining to find gross negligence where air club em-
ployee failed to inform participant of the known hazard of nearby power lines).
The definition of gross negligence varies by jurisdiction. The Boucher court, for
instance, uses the terms "willful, wanton, reckless or gross conduct" as a single,
descriptive phrase. Boucher, 514 A.2d at 488. Consequently, the standard used to
establish gross negligence also varies. In Falkner, the court ruled that willful and
wanton misconduct could be established by proof of a "conscious and knowing
disregard of substantial risk." Falkner, 533 N.E.2d at 946.
92 Durrel 1987 WL 18117, at *1.
93 Id. at *5.
94 Id. at *1.
95 Id. at *4.
96 Id. at *5.
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Clearly, in jurisdictions such as Maryland that are unreceptive
to recreational injury claims, the participant will have to battle
the court to establish gross negligence.17 Nonetheless, this par-
ticular claim is an encouraging prospect for recovery in cases
where the injury resulted from negligent failure to warn of par-
ticularized hazards.98 Because the provider is more likely to
have knowledge of the drop zone and the surrounding area, as
well as the technical criteria that defines safe jumping condi-
tions, any failure to inform the participant of significant risks
may be characterized as reckless or willful misconduct.9 A
proper pleading, with appropriate facts, should allow the partici-
pant to at least reach a jury-a significant improvement over a
case of simple negligence."'
B. INSURANCE
In the event that a participant cannot recover in either simple
negligence, due to contractual bars, or gross negligence, due to
poor facts, there remains the possibility of compensation
through private insurance.10 1 The possibility is limited, of
course, by the exact terms and exclusions contained in the pol-
icy. Unfortunately for air sport participants, most insurance pol-
icies contain aviation exclusions which deny coverage for all
claims which result from "participating" or "engaging" in
"aeronautics."102
Cases attempting to interpret the meaning of these terms to
determine if all air activities are excluded reveal a wide disparity
91 See Boucher, 514 A.2d at 488. The Boucher case points out the importance of
knowledge on the part of the tortfeasor. The terms "willful" and "reckless disre-
gard" carry, by definition, an element of knowledge of the danger to others.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1270, 1599 (6th ed. 1990). Clearly, an air sport partici-
pant must prove this element to prevail on a gross negligence claim.
98 See generally Boucher, 514 A.2d at 487.
99 See supra note 42 and accompanying text; Durrell, 1987 WL 18117, at *4.
100 In Falkner, 533 N.E.2d at 946, the court held that "[a]llegations of defend-
ants' conscious and knowing disregard of a substantial risk support a sufficient
pleading of... wilful [sic] and wanton misconduct." Thus, at least in Illinois, the
standard for gross negligence may itself constitute proper pleadings.
101 The majority of cases in this area involve comprehensive life insurance poli-
cies. See, e.g., Hanover Ins. Co. v. Showalter, 561 N.E.2d 1230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990);
Cabell, 599 S.W.2d at 652; Bew v. Travelers Ins. Co., 112 A. 859 (N.J. 1921).
102 Aviation exclusions have been around since the beginning of flight.
GEORGE W. LUPTON, JR., CML AVIATION LAW 140 (1935) ("When the terms ...
were first introduced into insurance contracts, the science or art was in its experi-
mental stage.") (quoting Gregory v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 78 F.2d 522, 524 (8th
Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 635 (1935)).
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of opinion. 103 The plaintiff is generally aided by the interpretive
canon that requires construction to favor the insured where am-
biguity exists in the language of the policy.104 But, a successful
bid to defeat the exclusion will depend largely on the type of air
sport activity in question.0 5
Air sports which involve a significant level of control over the
airborne instrument typically are interpreted as involving partic-
ipation or engagement. 0 6 For instance, both hang-gliding and
para-planeing (a form of parachuting) require the pilot to steer
a course and control the lift of the instrument. 0 7 By contrast, in
Hanover Insurance Co. v. Showalter,10 8 the court found for the in-
sured because simple descent by a non-sport parachute was held
to be distinguishable from the more active forms of
parachuting.109
The Engel court took an entirely different approach. Instead
of struggling with the nature of the sport instrument itself, the
court referred to the parachutist's presence in the airplane used
to ascend to jumping height to justify holding that his claim was
excluded. 10 This reasoning suggests that because "the act of
parachuting is so intimately associated with the use of the air-
plane as to be inseparable from it""' and because use of an air-
103 See Irwin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 5 F. Supp. 382, 384 (E.D. Mich.
1933) (finding pilot of glider to have "engaged in aviation operations"); Bew, 112
A. at 861 (holding that a passenger participates); but see Missouri State Life Ins.
Co. v. Martin, 69 S.W.2d 1081, 1083 (Ark. 1934) (where deceased was a mere
invited passenger, no participation may be found); Engel v. Credit Life Ins. Co.,
377 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that policy's "while leaving
any kind of aircraft" clause did not encompass parachuting within the meaning
of the contract).
104 Engel, 377 N.W.2d at 345; Irwin, 5 F. Supp. at 383.
105 Note the surprising conclusion in Pittman, 17 F.2d at 370, that a passenger
killed by contact with the propeller after the end of an airplane ride was "partici-
pating" in "aeronautic activity." Id. at 370-71.
106 See Totten v. New York Life Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 1082 (Or. 1985); Cabell, 599
S.W.2d at 652.
107 See Cabell 599 S.W.2d at 652.
108 Hanover, 561 N.E.2d at 1230.
10 Id. at 1232. Notably, there appears to be no case on record that resorts to
the FAR definition of parachute jump, supra note 35, to aid in interpretation.
The FAR definition uses the term "descent" rather than "flight," suggesting that
parachuting is distinguishable from other types of "aviation." See supra note 35.
But, the definition also makes clear that the parachutist is leaving an "aircraft in
flight," doing damage to any argument that no "flight" is involved. Supra note 35.
110 Engel, 377 N.W.2d at 344-45.
111 John Deere Ins. Co. v. Penna, 416 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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plane can be seen as participation, 112 coverage may be denied
for injuries sustained by "passive" as well as "active" participation
in air sports. Cases that follow this logic seem to take the basic
"danger" involved in airplane flight into consideration.' 13 This
is somewhat unjustified when the modern state of technology
and safety advancements are factored into the assessment.114
Moreover, when seen in connection with negligence suits such
as Jones v. Dressel, which denied recovery for collateral acts of
negligence, it becomes apparent that the parachutist will be vir-
tually unable to protect himself or herself against the unfore-
seen event of an airplane crash.
The practitioner's dilemma lies in the nature of insurance liti-
gation. In spite of the interpretive canons favoring the in-
sured, 15 there is no sure way to predict how a court will view the
air sport activity in light of the language of the policy exclusion.
Moreover, there is no way to overcome the logical conclusion
that hang-gliding and ultralight piloting 1 6 constitute participa-
112 See id. at 823; Bew, 112 A. at 860 (insured was a mere passenger in a private
plane).
113 Safeco Ins. Co. v. Husker Aviation, Inc., 317 N.W.2d 745 (Neb. 1982); see
Jones, 623 P.2d at 370.
114 "These implements of the air have been developed from the stage of the
dangerous experiment to a well recognized standard means of... transportation
.... The terms [used in insurance contracts] must be considered in the light of
these known revolutionary changes and developments in the art." LUPTON, supra
note 102, at 140-41 (quoting Gregory, 78 F.2d at 524). This early twentieth century
observation carries even more force in the 1990s.
115 In truth, there are two canons at work in insurance cases. First, ambiguous
language in a policy must be interpreted in favor of the insured and against the
insurer, the drafter of the exclusion. Irwin, 5 F. Supp. at 383. Courts intent upon
denying coverage often eschew any ambiguity to avoid the difficulty presented by
the canon. "Contract terms are not ambiguous simply because the parties do not
agree on their meaning." Hanover, 561 N.E.2d at 1231. Second, terms in insur-
ance documents are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning when the term
is not defined in the policy itself. Cabell, 599 S.W.2d at 654. In the parachuting
context, this canon denies the plaintiff the benefits of the FAR definition. Fur-
ther, the canon has not prevented close distinctions between types of parachutes
in interpreting the term "participation in aviation."
116 Under a policy such as that in Enge, 377 N.W.2d at 343, perhaps the only
air sport participant who would have no clear argument for coverage would be
the ultralight pilot. The exclusion provides no benefits for injuries sustained
"while in or on, or entering or leaving any kind of aircraft, except as a passenger
in a duly licensed passenger aircraft . . . and flown by a pilot duly licensed to
operate such aircraft." Id. Because ultralights are defined as solo aircraft, there
is no pilot to depend upon, as there might be in a hang gliding incident. More-
over, the FARs do not require licensing of ultralights. 14 C.F.R. § 103.7(b). This




tion in aeronautics. Clearly, the most optimistic cases involve
the casual balloon ride or tandem training jump, where the par-
ticipant has absolutely no control.117 The better option for the
control-intensive sports participant lies in a products liability
claim against the sports or safety equipment manufacturer.
C. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
1. Introduction
Products liability cases against equipment manufacturers hold
a few distinct advantages over negligence and insurance claims.
First, the standard exculpatory clause will likely not be effective
to exclude claims in strict liability. Second, in circumstances
where a release is ineffective, the participant is then free to
prove liability without the need to prove fault, one of the major
evidentiary differences in strict products liability cases. Third,
the traditional defense of assumption of the risk has been given
less weight in products liability cases. Finally, the products liabil-
ity arena provides some distinctively helpful theories of recovery
that do not come into play in the negligence context. There-
fore, the opportunities for recovery in products liability are
some of the most encouraging to be found.
2. Exculpatory Clauses
The typical exculpatory clause used by air sport providers will
often not bar a suit in products liability. Because many of the
clauses do not address the area of manufacturing or design de-
fects, the canon which demands interpretation against the
drafter will usually work to allow products liability actions if not
specifically waived by the release. 1 8 Therefore, where a release
merely limits negligence suits and does not include the manu-
"7 In Coleman v. Charlesworth, 623 N.E.2d 1366 (Ill. 1993), the plaintiffs, pro-
vider and estates of the deceased, sought coverage for a $4.4 million judgment
obtained from the trial court for the deaths and injuries sustained in a balloon
accident. The battle with the insurance company over the terms was for indem-
nity on the judgment. Thus, Coleman represents the rare scenario of insurance
denial in spite of a bona fide tort recovery.
118 Deidrich v. Wright, 550 F. Supp. 805, 808 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("Such a clause,
however, must be strictly construed against the party seeking immunity from lia-
bility, and the intentions of the parties should be delineated 'with the greatest of
particularity."') (quoting Berwind Corp. v. Litton Indus., 532 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir.
1976)).
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facturer" 9 or defects within the class of protected people or oc-
currences, a court would likely rule in favor of the participant's
right to suit.12 0 Where, however, the exculpatory clause is care-
fully drafted to include these elements, there exists the chance
that a court may deem the release adequate as to product
defects. 12 1
Even where the exculpatory clause is worded clearly enough
to alert the participant to the totality of the rights waived, there
is a second, and more powerful argument against the validity of
an exculpatory clause with regard to strict products liability
causes of action. In Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc.,122 the court stated
that "there is a strong policy against allowing product suppliers
to disclaim liability for injuries caused by defects in the products
they place on the market."' 23 In fact, the entire area of products
liability came about in response to manufacturers' attempts to
contractually limit their liability to the detriment of the public at
large.' 24 This public policy against product manufacturer im-
munity from liability is just the sort of public policy which tradi-
tionally voids an exculpatory clause. 125 Thus, the exculpatory
I See Benson v. American Aerolights, Inc., No. 83 C 1457, 1985 WL 965, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 1985), which states: "Because [the manufacturer] has offered
no evidence to suggest that it was a party to the contract, and the contract itself
makes no mention of [the manufacturer], we find . . . that under Illinois' strict
construction rule, [the manufacturer] cannot rely on the release in denying lia-
bility to the plaintiff."
120 Deidrich, 550 F. Supp. at 809 (ruling that the release at issue not only did
not bar a strict liability claim, but did not bar suit in negligence due to lack of
clearly expressed terms).
121 See Johnson, 460 S.E.2d at 398. The clause at issue in Johnson waived claims
on all "hidden, latent, or obvious defects." Id. at 402. The court resolved the
interpretive issue as follows:
Design defects are one type of defect, whether they are hidden,
latent, or obvious. Accordingly, defects arising from the negligent
design of the equipment clearly come within this exclusion, as
would design defects based on strict liability or warranty theo-
ries .... When we strictly construe the waiver, this conclusion is
nevertheless inescapable.
Id.
122 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
123 Id. at 799.
124 Wheelock v. Sport Kites, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 730, 737 (D. Haw. 1993).
125 See Winslow & Asprelli, supra note 61. The Wheelock court perhaps stated
the concept best when it noted that:
The doctrine of strict liability is based not only on the public policy
of discouraging the marketing and distribution of defective prod-
ucts, but also on the reasoning that a manufacturer is in a far better
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clause may often be significantly less powerful in the products
liability context than in the case of negligence suits.
3. Evidentiaiy Benefits
An additional benefit of the strict liability case is the lack of a
need to prove fault or a breach of a duty of care on the part of
the defendant manufacturer or equipment designer.1 26 This ba-
sic distinction allows for a different evidentiary standard that,
under certain circumstances, may make proving the plaintiffs
case somewhat easier than in a basic negligence suit. 12 7
For instance, in Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises,128 the
Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the rule barring evi-
dence of design modifications undertaken subsequent to the in-
jury at bar12 9 in negligence cases is inapplicable to strict liability
suits.13 ° The court noted that the policy which underlies the
rule-to encourage and not to punish the remedy of defects-is
position than individual consumers to insure against the risk of in-
jury and to distribute costs among consumers.
Wheelock, 839 F. Supp. at 737.
126 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides in part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property .... (2) The rule stated in Subsection
(1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of his product ....
See Freeman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Nos. 80-11-0119, 80-11-0120, 80-11-0121,
1983 WL 4495 (Ohio CL App. 1983) [hereinafter Freeman I] (assigning error to
addition of "reasonable care" standard to jury instruction on strict liability);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (noting that
manufacturer's liability for injuries caused by defective products "is not one gov-
erned by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort." Id.
(emphasis added)); see alsoJAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS
535 (4th ed. 1994) ("In contrast to negligence, strict liability makes no distinction
based on the presence or absence of fault on the part of the defendant.").
127 The non-applicability of the exclusionary rule in products liability cases is
not a universal holding. The majority of federal courts continue to exclude evi-
dence of subsequent modifications, while many, if not most, state courts feel that
Rule 407 is limited to cases of negligence. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 469-70
(John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992). The United States Supreme Court has
recently submitted a proposed amendment to Fed. R. Evid. 407 which would cod-
ify the federal majority opinion and secure the exclusion of this type of evidence
in federal cases.
128 491 A.2d 389 (Conn. 1985).
129 See FED. R. EVID. 407 which states: "evidence of the subsequent measures is
not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event."
Id. (emphasis added).
130 Sanderson, 491 A.2d at 396.
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not a significant factor in products liability cases."' 1 The court
went on to note:
Given the strong economic influences on the conduct of a de-
signer or manufacturer created by the existence of the strict lia-
bility theory, it is unlikely that any evidentiary use of subsequent
remedial measures will discourage a designer or manufacturer
from taking them. It is unnecessary therefore to bolster the ten-
dency to take such measures through the use of the exclusionary
rule applicable in negligence actions. "In the products liability
area, the exclusionary rule ... does not affect the primary con-
duct of the mass producer of goods, but serves merely as a shield
against potential liability."' 3
2
Because there is no risk in a products liability case of a false
determination of fault based upon the subsequent modifica-
tions, the strict liability theory not only dispenses with the need
to establish a duty of care, but may also allow the introduction of
evidence which would otherwise be barred in a fault-based ac-
tion such as negligence.
One of the preeminent cases in the air sport-products liability
area can be used as an example of the potential power of subse-
quent modification evidence. In Prince v. Parachutes, Inc., 3 ' the
participant brought a suit based upon a theory of failure to warn
of the dangers of the parachute for lower skill levels.' 34 The ad-
missible evidence suggested that the dangers were unap-
preciated by both the parachutist and the safety officer
consulted on the issue. 135 The court reversed a summary judg-
ment for the defendant based upon this evidence.1 6 But, under
the reasoning of Sanderson, the plaintiff could have significantly
strengthened his theory that the existing warnings were inade-
quate by the introduction of any subsequent warnings instituted
by the manufacturer. In an area as hostile to recovery as air
sports injury, an evidentiary advantage such as this should be
utilized in all appropriate cases.' 37
13, Id. at 394.
132 Id. at 395-96 (quoting Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148,
1152 (1974)).
13" 685 P.2d at 83.
134 Id. at 83.
135 Id. at 86.
136 Id.
137 It perhaps goes without saying that the use of this evidentiary strategy re-
quires attention at the pleading stage by the court in which the action is filed
(preferably state court, see supra note 126) and the parties named as defendants.
In order to preserve the possibility of using the evidence of a subsequent modifi-
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4. Affirmative Defense of Assumption of the Risk
Strict products liability cases are more plaintiff-friendly in yet
another respect, namely in the area of affirmative defenses. Ac-
tions in both negligence and products liability are open to at-
tack by the doctrine of assumption of the risk. While usually
fatal to a negligence cause of action if proven, 1 3 the situation is
more hopeful in a defective product case.
In Freeman v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,13 9 the Court of Appeals of
Ohio refuted the use of the doctrine of assumption of the risk
on the facts of that case.' In Beech Aircraft, four passengers of a
twin-engine aircraft manufactured by Beech were killed in a
crash due to an alleged design defect in the airplane. However,
the defendants put forth the claim that the plaintiff assumed the
risk of injury by "undertaking a potentially hazardous training
flight in an overloaded airplane not equipped with fully func-
tioning dual controls."14 1 In response, the court noted that as-
sumption of the risk doctrine has three basic elements: (1) one
must have full knowledge of a condition; (2) such condition
must be patently dangerous to him; and (3) he must voluntarily
expose himself to the hazard created.142 Therefore, even where
some other conduct on the part of the injured might have
caused injury, if the injuries are proven to be "due to a design
defect in the [product] unknown to [the] parties, assumption of
risk is not a defense available to the manufacturer of the [prod-
uct] in a suit . . .claiming liability for negligent design"143 or
other strict liability theories.
Similarly, in Diedrich v. Wright,1" the defendants argued that
because the "plaintiff was fully aware of the hazards inherent in
skydiving, she assumed the risk of any injury." 145 The court did
not agree and stated that "[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether
plaintiff recognized the hazards of skydiving, rather, the ques-
cation, it might become necessary to join one or more non-diverse parties to a
state action in order to prevent removal to a relatively more hostile federal court.
See FED. R. CIrv. P. § 1441 (a).
138 This discussion is undertaken with the understanding that the doctrine of
assumption of the risk has been declining in favor in recent years. See Judges,
supra note 6, at 89 for a discussion of the shortcomings of the doctrine.
139 Freeman II, 1983 WL 4495, at *1.




144 550 F. Supp. at 808.
145 Id. at 807.
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tion is whether she knew that the parachute was defective."146
Thus, where it can be proven that the plaintiff was not aware of
the defective condition, the defense of assumption of the risk is
inapplicable as a matter of law.147
In spite of these decisions, the air sports participant must bear
in mind that knowledge by the participant of the design or man-
ufacturing defect may allow the defendant to use the assump-
tion of the risk doctrine to its advantage. For instance, in Benson
v. American Aerolights, Inc.,1 48 the plaintiff alleged that the ultra-
light aircraft in question was generally defective due to its de-
sign. 149 The court, therefore, held that because the plaintiff was
not alleging a "particular production flaw" and it appeared that
he had some familiarity with the aircraft before the injuries oc-
curred, he was not entitled to summary judgment against the
defendant on the issue.' Thus, Benson stands for the proposi-
tion that even in a products liability case, the plaintiff may have
to prove lack of knowledge or experience with the product in
order to avoid the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk.
5. Dangerously Defective Product Theory and the Consumer
Expectation Test
The final, and perhaps most important advantage to a suit in
products liability for air sports injuries, is the availability of the
theories of "dangerously defective" products and the "consumer
expectation test." These two theories essentially work to turn
the barriers to recovery in negligence on their heads in the
products liability context. Instead of allowing the service pro-
vider to take shelter behind the basically hazardous nature of
the activity, these theories hold the equipment manufacturer re-
sponsible for injuries due to a hazardous product being on the
market. Hence, the air sport participant is not deemed the sole
responsible party for the serious injuries which often accompany
parachuting, hang-gliding, and other air sports.
One of the most cogent explanations of the concept of a dan-
gerously defective product is found in Laing v. American Honda
Motor Co.,15 a case involving an all terrain-vehicle. According to
the Louisiana Court of Appeals, there are at least two ways of
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 1985 WL 965, at *3.
149 Id.
150 Id. at *2 (contrasting the instant case with Diedrich, 550 F. Supp. at 805).
151 628 So. 2d 196 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
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determining if the vehicle was unreasonably dangerous due to
its design: "(1) a reasonable person would conclude that the
danger-in-fact, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the useful-
ness of the product.., or [(2)] although the utility of the prod-
uct outweighs its danger-in-fact, there was a feasible way to
design the product with less harmful consequences. 1 52 Thus, in
an air sports context, a jury would have to determine if the util-
ity of the parachute, ultra-light vehicle, or other equipment, as
designed, was outweighed by the dangers posed by its use.
Clearly, in the case of air sports, the danger posed by using
poorly designed equipment is almost always serious injury or
death. Given that, it would be the rare product indeed whose
utility would outweigh its risks. Hence, the air sports context is
ripe for use of this doctrine.
If the reasons for denial of recovery put forth in Part III are
examined carefully, they become less daunting when viewed in
conjunction with the dangerously defective product theory. For
example, the prevailing judicial opinion that air sports are so
inherently dangerous that any participant must accept the risks
involved1 53 carries less force if the equipment (used to keep the
participant airborne) is designed so as to increase the risk of
falling. In such circumstances, the danger-in-fact of falling now
outweighs the utility of the product for recreation. Under the
dangerously defective product theory, the participant would be
entitled to recovery, rather than barred because of the inherent
risks of the sport. Moreover, the product manufacturer now
would be the one who must bear the burden of placing faulty air
sports equipment on the market.154
Closely analogous to the defectively dangerous design theory
is the consumer expectation test used in Freeman v. Beech Aircraft
Corp.1 55 In Freeman, the court determined that a product design
is defective if "it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer
would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foresee-
able manner."156 When using this test, the focus shifts from the
reasonableness of the activity for which the product is used to
the reasonableness of the user in expecting the product to per-
form at a given level. For instance, if the product at issue is a
152 Id. at 201.
153 See cases discussed supra note 51.
154 See Wheelock, 839 F. Supp. at 737.
155 Freeman II, 1983 WL 4495, at *1.
156 Id. at *8 (quoting syllabus of Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814,
815 (Ohio 1982)).
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parachute, the question becomes whether the ordinary con-
sumer would expect the parachute to open and retard the de-
scent of the user. If the parachute does not so open, and a jury
finds that it is not unreasonable for the parachutist to expect
that from the product, the parachutist might well be entitled to
recover from the parachute manufacturer.'57
A practitioner should keep in mind that there are defenses to
both the dangerously defective product theory and the con-
sumer expectation test for a defective product. For example, in
Laing, the defendants attempted to introduce a "comparative
risk analysis" to refute the determination that its all terrain-vehi-
cle was dangerously defective. 158 The defendant asserted that
the risk of an all terrain-vehicle must be "compared with other
encountered recreational activities such as snowmobiling,
skateboarding, parachuting, and the like. " 159 The court, how-
ever, felt that the introduction of such an analysis would obscure
the relevant issues of the case, and therefore excluded the prof-
fered evidence. 6 ° In spite of the positive ruling in the Laing
case, this determination is a discretionary one by the trial judge
and should be prepared for in advance by the plaintiff.6 '
The foregoing should indicate the significant advantages that
a suit in strict products liability may have when compared to a
suit for negligence in the air sports context. At least under
some circumstances, the practitioner may avoid the exculpatory
clause, the exclusion of evidence which is probative of liability,
or the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk. In addi-
tion, the defectively dangerous product theory and consumer
expectation test are better suited to recovery for injuries sus-
tained from hazardous activities than a negligence theory.
However, these advantages can only be utilized where there is
a plausible argument for a product defect or inadequate warn-
ing. Strict products liability will not help cure all of the
157 The rewards for finding a theory that works can be considerable. In Gray v.
Lockheed Aeronautical Sys. Co., 880 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1995), the plaintiff
recovered ajudgment in excess of $4 million in a defective design suit for wrong-
ful death. The theory was bolstered by a showing that the manufacturer failed to
meet government specifications for military equipment. Id. at 1567.
15s Laing, 628 So. 2d at 202.
159 Id.
160 Id. (The "vehicle ... must be judged and evaluated on its own merits, not
in regard to snowmobiles, or bungee jumping apparatus, go-carts or any other
remotely analogous recreational activity.").
161 See id.; see also FED. R. EWqD. 403 (limiting introduction of relevant but possi-
bly prejudicial or misleading evidence).
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problems that a plaintiff may encounter. In particular, where
the injuries are sustained due to contact with a dangerous condi-
tion on land, the participant must deal with a whole host of new
barriers to recovery.
IV. LIMITATION OF LAND OWNER LIABILITY
The subject of land owner liability for injuries sustained
thereon has been the subject of numerous articles in recent
past.1 62 Treatment of the subject here is not intended to reflect
the full range of concerns which can or perhaps should be ad-
dressed. Instead, the topic is broached in an effort to briefly
highlight the ways in which land owner liability can have an im-
pact on the air sport participant in search of compensation for
injuries with the basic understanding that circumvention of the
recreational use statutes discussed below may decrease the total
recreational opportunities available, and therefore, do more
harm than good to participants' interests. But, it should be ac-
knowledged that there are ambiguities in these statutes that may
provide for the chance of recovery from injuries sustained on
recreational lands. Nonetheless, where appropriate, attempts
have been made to provide a bridge to those materials which
deal with different perspectives in more depth. 163
A. COMMON LAW CONCEPTS
Prior to the statutory reforms instituted in the 1950s and
1960s,164 landowner liability for injuries sustained by others on
the property was ascertained by reference to the common law's
"status" rules. 65 The landowner owed different levels of care
depending on the entrant's status as either: (1) a trespasser-
one who enters the land without an invitation to do so; (2) a
licensee-one who enters by way of the owner's express or im-
plied permission for his own purposes; or (3) an invitee-one
162 See, e.g., Judges, supra note 6, at 93-99; Cathy Hansen & Steve Duerr, Recrea-
tional Injuries & Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreation Safety Act, 28 LAND & WATER L.
Ruv. 149 (1993); Alexander T. Pendleton, Wisconsin's Recreational Use Statute, 66-
MAY Wis. LAW. 14 (1993); John C. Becker, Landowner or Occupier Liability for Per-
sonal Injuries and Recreational Use Statutes: How Effective Is the Protection?, 24 IND. L.
REv. 1587 (1991); N. Linda Goldstein et al., Recreational Use Statutes-Time for Re-
form, PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 1989, at 6, 7.
163 Notably, Donald P. Judges has presented a thoughtful analysis of "risk
choice" and the effects of recreational use statutes on that perspective. Judges,
supra note 6, at 93-99.
164 Becker, supra note 162, at 1587.
165 Id.; see Goldstein et. al., supra note 162, at 8.
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who enters for the owner's purposes. 166 Generally, the owner
owes the invitee the greatest level of care, which includes the
duty to inspect for and warn of dangerous conditions upon the
land. 67 The licensee is owed at least a duty of warning of dan-
gerous conditions, while the trespasser is due no more than to
be free of willful or intentional acts which cause harm to person
or property. 68 The burdens of determining a given entrant's
status, as well as the burden of policing lands for dangers, put
the landowner at risk of incurring significant liability without
reasonable means of avoiding the risks.169 Concurrently, there
was an increase in the demand for recreational space which was
not capable of being filled by public lands alone.170 Thus, in
1965, the Model Recreational Use Statute was developed to en-
courage private land owners to open lands to the public by sim-
plifying and, in most cases, limiting the owner's liability for
injuries sustained by the entrant.1 7' Today, forty-nine states
have adopted some form of the model statute. 172
B. RECREATIONAL USE STATUTES
The relevance of recreational use statutes to the subject of air
sport injury recovery may at first appear somewhat obscure. In-
deed, the greatest likelihood of injury from participation in par-
achuting, ballooning, or hang gliding would seem to stem from
the airborne nature of these sports. However, the participant
must takeoff and land somewhere, and the condition of the land
may have serious consequences for the safety of those events. So
much so, in fact, that a number of states have included air sports
by name in their definition of "recreational activities" or "recrea-
166 Goldstein et al., supra note 162, at 8.
167 Id.; Becker, supra note 162, at 1587.
168 See Becker, supra note 162, at 1587; Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern
Status of Rules Conditioning Landowner's Liability Upon Status of Injured Party as Invi-
tee, Licensee, or Trespasser, 22 A.L.R. 4th 294 (1983).
169 Becker, supra note 162, at 1588; Goldstein et al., supra note 162, at 8.
170 Goldstein et al., supra note 162, at 7-8.
'7' 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 150-51 (1964) provides:
An act to encourage landowners to make land and water areas avail-
able to the public by limiting liability in connection therewith....
"Recreational purpose" includes, but is not limited to, any of the
following, or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming,
boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature
study, water skiing, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying histori-
cal, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites.
172 Goldstein et al., supra note 162, at 7.
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tional purpose."1 73 Thus, while the recreational use statutes
might not pose as serious a barrier to recovery as the realities
presented above, an understanding of their coverage and limita-
tions may aid recovery in proper circumstances.1 7 4
Most of the issues that arise in connection with recreational
use statutes revolve around the definition of the actors and cir-
cumstances which trigger the limitations on liability. 175 The fol-
lowing represents a survey of the most commonly controverted
elements of the statutes.
1. Who Is an Owner?
Under the 1965 Model Act, the term "owner" is intended to
cover "a possessor of a fee interest in property or a lesser inter-
est."176 The definition has been extended to others by judicial
decision in many jurisdictions. 7 7 The most intriguing issue re-
lated to ownership is the status of governmental entities, or own-
ers of public lands. Decisions have varied considerably and
research into any given jurisdiction is necessary to determine if a
suit against a governmental entity can be maintained. 7 8
2. What Is a Recreational Activity or Purpose?
Admittedly, each state defines its recreational purpose differ-
ently, although most conform to the basic format of the 1965
Model Act. 179 This means that in addition to a list of specific
activities that are to be considered "recreational," the statute will
employ some catch-all language in an attempt to avoid a deter-
mination that the list is exclusive.180 Nonetheless, there is end-
less case law concerning all manner of activities resulting in
173 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-557f(4) (1995) (including hang gliding,
sport parachuting, and hot air ballooning); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.52 (1) (g) (West
Supp. 1995) (including ballooning and hang gliding).
174 For instance, in a case such as Hammerlind, 258 N.W.2d at 590 (decided on
other grounds), where the plaintiff drowned after parachuting into a lake, the
estate might have sued the landowner because of the danger posed by the condi-
tion of the land.
175 See Pendleton, supra note 162, at 14.
176 Becker, supra note 162, at 1596.
177 Id. at 1597.
178 See, e.g., Ravell v. United States, 22 F.3d 960, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that United States is not liable under California's recreational use statute);
Pensacola v. Stamm, 448 So. 2d 39, 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (declining to
interpret statute to limit liability of United States).
179 See Becker, supra note 162, at 1591, 1600.
180 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-41-102(5) (West 1990) ("'Recreational
purpose' includes, but is not limited to ..... ").
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injury. 8" In addition to the status of a specific activity, there is
significant debate over the approach to interpretation. 182
3. What Constitutes a "Charge"for Use of the Land?
The 1965 Model Statute, as well as the state versions, limits
application of the statute to landowners who do not make pecu-
niary gain from those who take advantage of its use. 183 The issue
then becomes what constitutes a charge amounting to impermis-
sible gain? 8 4 The language of the Model Statute implies that
any amount charged will expose the landowner to liability. But
case law and legislation have lessened the severity of such an
interpretation.
For example, the Wisconsin statute allows pecuniary benefit
so long as "the aggregate value of all payments received by the
owner.., during the year in which the injury occurs [does not]
exceed[ ] $2,000."185 The Wisconsin appellate court has ruled,
in interpreting the statute, that the legislature intended "to find
liability for profit-making uses, whether the profit results from
direct charges for the recreational activity, or indirectly, from a
pecuniary benefit accruing to the owner from the recreational
activity."1 6 Similarly, in Mississippi, the legislature has specifi-
cally provided that "operation of a concession stand by a land-
owner on the recreational area will prevent the application of
the statute."'8 v Hence, the landowner who is offering the land
in a truly gratuitous manner is clearly shielded from liability.
18, See, e.g., Sievert v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 528 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Wis.
1995) (holding that walking on dock in order to greet a neighbor was not "recre-
ational activity" as per Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 895.52(1) (g)); Rapid City Softball Ass'n,
514 N.W.2d at 693, 696 (reasoning that softball was dissimilar enough to the
listed activities to be outside of the statute's intent); Fisher v. United States, 534 F.
Supp. 514, 516 (D. Mont. 1982) (holding school sponsored picnic was "recrea-
tional" in nature because commonly so considered).
182 See Schneider v. United States of America Adacia Nat'l Park, 760 F.2d 366,
368 (1st Cir. 1985) (using an objective approach); Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley
Water Dist., 157 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615-16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (ruling on literal
approach to listed activities that walking a bicycle is not hiking).
183 Liability is to be limited to "situations in which [owners] are compensated for
the use of their property." 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 150 (1964) (emphasis
added).
184 See, e.g., id. § 2(d) ("'Charge' means the admission price or fee asked in
return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land.").
185 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.52(6)(a) (West Supp. 1983).
186 Douglas v. Dewey, 453 N.W.2d 500, 505 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).




Those who attempt to mix profits with pleasure apparently do so
at their own risk.
4. What Are the Limits of the Term "Invitation"?
Under the language of most statutes, the landowner is im-
mune from liability for injury if he or she "directly or indirectly
invites or permits without charge any person to use [his or her
land]."18 Some questions have arisen, however, as to whether
the landowner may escape liability for injuries to persons who
were not invited in any way.1 89 In Gibson v. Keith,190 one of the
leading cases on the question, the court determined that the
statute's protection was forfeited when a landowner attempted
to limit access to the property, such as by posting "No Trespass-
ing" signs.1 91 In contrast, in Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., '92
the defendant owner had "granted permission to the public to
enter its land for certain recreational purposes" and "left an ap-
parent unrestricted entry" to the property. 9 3 The court ruled
that even though the defendant had characterized the plaintiff
in its answer as a trespasser, indicating lack of invitation, the
requisite consent to entry was to be inferred from conduct.194
So, one attempting to sue a landowner may be able to circum-
vent the liability limitation if the landowner unequivocally at-
tempted to prevent the public from entering the lands.
5. What Constitutes Willful and Malicious Conduct?
The final issue of serious concern with the statutes involves
the prohibition against willful, wanton, or malicious acts by the
landowner which is contained in every state statute.1 95 As in the
context of exculpatory clauses,1 96 there is room for play in the
terms, and the case law reflects changing sympathies toward al-
188 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 150, at § 4.
189 SeeJudges, supra note 6, at 93. Judges points out that the results of cases in
this area seem to punish rather than reward those who attempt to go beyond the
statutory duty of care.
190 492 A.2d 241 (Del. 1985).
191 Id. at 246.
192 531 N.W.2d 341 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), affd, 547 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1996).
193 Id. at 345.
194 Id.
195 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-08-05 (1989 & Supp. 1995) which states:
"Nothing in this chapter limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists for:
1. Willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition,
use, structure, or activity ......
196 See supra text accompanying notes 91-100.
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lowing recovery on this basis.'97 Clearly, a pleading of willful or
malicious conduct is worth pursuing if the landowner's failure
to warn of or to correct a dangerous condition is done with
knowledge or is otherwise particularly shocking.
The above review should make clear that there is substantial
room for recovery within the nooks and crannies of the average
recreational use statute. The success of any given suit will de-
pend largely on the jurisdiction's approach and the specific
wording of the statute. Air sports injuries that are due to noth-
ing more than simple contact with the earth will likely not un-
dergird a suit against a private landowner. But, where any of the
uncertainties explored above are at issue, the air sport partici-
pant may be able to receive compensation for injuries sustained
on recreational lands.
V. CONCLUSION
The unique challenges facing the injured air sport participant
seeking recovery for another's wrongful behavior are numerous,
and in some cases insurmountable. The current FAA regula-
tions, the standard exculpatory clauses used by providers, the
aviation limitations utilized in most insurance policies, and the
recreational use statutes found in nearly every state serve to pro-
tect almost every party except the injured. Nonetheless, as this
Comment should help make clear, there are ways to defeat the
most typical barriers to recovery. An understanding of the tools
available will not only ease the burdens on the practitioner at
trial or in negotiations, but may also allow for some cogent pre-
ventive advice to the client who is a known air sports enthusiast.
197 See, e.g., Termini v. United States, 963 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that United States Forest Service had committed willful and malicious
act when it constructed and maintained road which ended at drop off without
any warning).
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